Fake Bank Messages and Fraudulent Payment Links in Kuwait: Who Bears the Loss and What to Do

A text message arrives carrying a familiar logo and an alarming line: "Your card has been temporarily suspended," or "Unusual withdrawal attempt on your account," or "Pay a small delivery fee to release your parcel." Beneath it sits a short link that promises to fix everything with one tap. You open it and land on a page that looks like the payment screen you use every day. You type in your card number and expiry date, a verification code arrives on your phone, you enter it where the page asks, and minutes later you discover that money has left your account for a party you have never heard of. This is the most common form of banking fraud today, and it does not require the fraudster to break into any bank system. It is enough that you hand over the key yourself.

At that moment the same question reaches our office again and again: who bears the loss? The customer says the bank is responsible for protecting the money and that the message looked official. The bank says the customer disclosed the code personally and that the contract forbids exactly that. The honest answer is neither "always the bank" nor "always the customer." It depends on how the transaction happened, what the customer actually disclosed, whether the bank had adequate alerting and blocking in place, and what the messages, the statement and the transaction logs can prove.

This article takes one specific angle: messages, links and calls that impersonate a bank or a payment provider. We will not repeat the general discussion of cybercrime found in our articles on cybercrime in Kuwaiti law and on the provisions, penalties and defences of the cybercrime framework, nor the guide to security and collateral in banking protection in Kuwait, nor physical card theft, which we covered in bank fraud and stolen cards. Here we focus on how to recognise the fake message, what to do in the first minutes, how the loss is divided between customer and bank, how the fraudster's conduct is classified under criminal law in general terms, how to prove what happened, and how to avoid it happening again.

Quick Answer

There is no single rule that puts the loss always on the bank or always on the customer. As a starting point, the bank is a trustee of its customers' money and owes a professional standard of care in securing transactions, while the customer must keep personal credentials and codes confidential. If a customer discloses a verification code or a secret number to someone posing as the bank, that is usually weighed as fault on the customer's side, which may reduce or in some cases defeat the claim against the bank, depending on the facts. It does not automatically relieve the bank of its own failings, such as no alert on an unusual transaction, slow blocking after the customer reported, or processing a transaction that did not match the account's pattern. How much each side is responsible for is for the court to assess.

• What do I do first? Block the card and the online banking service immediately through the bank's official channel, then notify the bank in writing. Do not delete the messages and do not close the payment page before taking screenshots.
• Is a phone call to the bank enough? It is an essential first step for speed, but it does not replace a written complaint that records when you notified the bank and what you said, because proof turns on documentation.
• Should I also report to the authorities? Yes. The event is a possible crime, and a report opens the door to tracing and freezing the accounts that received the money, and it strengthens your position against the bank.
• Does disclosing the code forfeit my rights? Not necessarily. It is a significant element in assessing fault, but the court looks at how convincing the deception was and at the bank's conduct before and after the transaction.
• Can the fraudster be prosecuted? In principle yes. The criminal classification moves between fraud, obtaining money by technological means, and unauthorised access, and a person who made an account available to receive the funds may also be questioned.

Legislative Framework

Kuwait has no single statute called a "banking fraud law." The rules are spread across several texts that work together. First is the Civil Code, Law No. 67 of 1980, the reference for the contract between customer and bank: each side's obligations, performance in good faith, liability for fault, the effect of the injured party's own fault on the liability of the person who caused the damage, and the validity of clauses that try to exempt one party from liability. Next come the rules of the Commercial Code, Law No. 68 of 1980 on banking operations, which are commercial acts on the bank's side.

On the supervisory side, the banking sector is subject to the Law on Currency, the Central Bank of Kuwait and the Regulation of Banking Business, Law No. 32 of 1968, and to the supervisory instructions issued under it, including those dealing with customer protection, security of electronic operations and handling of complaints. A customer may also rely on the Consumer Protection Law, Law No. 39 of 2014, where the relationship with the service provider qualifies as a consumer relationship, particularly against unfair terms and misleading advertising. We explained this in our article on consumer protection and e-commerce.

The criminal side comes from the Penal Code, Law No. 16 of 1960, which deals with fraud, breach of trust and forgery, and from the Law on Combating Information Technology Crimes, Law No. 63 of 2015, which addresses unlawful access to systems and data and the use of technological means to take money or obtain payment data. Reporting, investigation and trial follow the Code of Criminal Procedure, Law No. 17 of 1960. Because stolen money usually passes through intermediary accounts before it is moved on, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Law, Law No. 106 of 2013 also forms part of the framework for tracing and freezing funds.

On evidence, the matter is governed by the Law of Evidence in Civil and Commercial Matters, Law No. 39 of 1980 and the Electronic Transactions Law, Law No. 20 of 2014, which give electronic records an evidentiary effect when their integrity and attribution are established. These are complemented by what we explained in our articles on proof by electronic messages and on digital evidence and its weight. Texts are amended from time to time, so the version in force must be checked when a claim or a complaint is filed.

Substantive Rules

First: forms of fraud that impersonate a bank

The impersonating text message. A message that appears to come from a bank, a payment provider or a courier, warning of a blocked card, a suspicious deduction or a required data update, and ending with a link. Its purpose is to create fear or urgency so that the recipient acts before thinking. The sender name on your phone may even display as the bank's name, because fraudsters can manipulate what appears as the sender. That is why even careful readers get caught.

The fraudulent payment link. A link leading to a page that imitates a genuine payment page. It asks for the card number, the expiry date and the code printed on the back, and then asks for the "verification code" sent to your phone. That code is what turns theft of card details into an actual executed transaction: at that moment the fraudster has already entered your details into a real purchase or transfer and is only waiting for the code that authorises it. The pretexts vary: customs or delivery fees, a supposed traffic fine, a refund, a customer reward, a subscription renewal.

The impersonating phone call. A person introduces himself as an employee of the bank's "fraud prevention department," quotes some correct details about you (your name, the last digits of your card, the name of your bank) to win your trust, and then asks for a code that has just reached you in order to "cancel the transaction." In truth the code is what approves it. The caller may also ask you to install a "support" application that lets him see and control your screen, or to move your money into a temporary "safe account" which is in fact his own or an intermediary's.

Fake pages and accounts on social media. An advertisement or account claiming to be a bank's customer service or a known shop, asking you to message it on a messaging application and send your details. This resembles what we covered in our article on account takeover and impersonation; the request for money or a code may also come from a friend's compromised account rather than from a stranger.

The "receive your payment" link in private sales. The fraudster offers to buy what you are selling (a car, furniture, a phone), then sends a "link to receive the money" and asks you to enter your card details so that the funds can reach you. Receiving money requires nothing more than an account number, and any page that asks for a code or a secret number in order to "receive" is a withdrawal page, not a deposit page. Our article on selling a car that is pledged or carries a bank loan shows why large transactions should go through official, documented channels rather than promises and links.

What all these forms have in common is three things: pressure of time, a request for data that a real bank never asks for by message or call, and a link or application outside the official channels. These are exactly the things a court looks at when it assesses how convincing the deception was and how careless the customer was at the same time.

Second: the customer's responsibility and the bank's responsibility

The legal basis of the relationship is the contract, and in this field it is usually a contract of adhesion, meaning the customer signs terms prepared in advance. Those terms place obligations on the customer: not to disclose the secret number or verification codes to anyone, even someone who claims to be from the bank; to notify the bank as soon as an unauthorised transaction is discovered; and to look after his devices. In return the bank has a core duty to safeguard the customer's funds and to execute only operations that carry the customer's valid authorisation, and it owes a professional duty of care in its security systems commensurate with the fact that it is an expert dealing with risk every day.

The event is viewed from two angles: was the transaction authorised by the customer? and did either party fall short? If the transaction was executed without any participation by the customer (for example, data stolen from another source), the starting point is that the bank had no valid authorisation and may not debit the customer's account, unless it proves that the customer caused the disclosure. If the customer himself entered the code, the bank argues that the transaction was authorised in proper form, and the customer argues that his consent was tainted by fraud because he acted under deception attributable to a third party.

Third: the effect of carelessness in disclosing the secret code

Disclosing the secret number or a verification code to an unknown person is the most serious point raised against the customer, because that code exists precisely to prove that the account holder is the one authorising the transaction. For that reason the bank tends to say that the customer "authorised" it or was "grossly negligent." But the weight of carelessness varies with the facts. The court usually looks at the following:

• How convincing the impersonation was. A clumsy message with odd links differs from one that arrived in the thread of the bank's genuine messages or under its usual sender name, and the court may assess the two very differently.
• What exactly the customer disclosed. Giving out a card number alone is different from giving out the verification code that approves the transaction; the latter weighs more heavily as the customer's fault.
• Prior warnings. Did the bank consistently warn customers that it never asks for codes by message or phone? If there were awareness campaigns and an explicit warning in the text of the code message itself, the argument against a customer who ignored them is stronger. If there were none, it is weaker.
• The content of the code message. Many code messages state the transaction, the merchant and the amount, and warn against sharing the code. A customer who typed the code despite reading a statement that contradicted his belief may carry more fault; one whose message was not sufficiently informative may be eased of it.
• The bank's conduct after the report. How fast it blocked the card, how it responded to a request to recall or hold the transaction with the receiving party where possible, and how it cooperated with the competent authorities. Delay here can leave the bank with a share of the loss even where the customer erred first.
• How unusual the transaction was for the account. A very large or repeated transaction to an unfamiliar outside party that contradicts the account's history raises a question: why did the monitoring system not stop it or ask for further confirmation?

In many cases courts end up dividing responsibility according to the seriousness of each party's fault rather than placing it all on one side, which is consistent with the general civil-law rule that the injured party's own fault may reduce compensation. As for a contract clause exempting the bank from all liability for any transaction in which the verification code was entered, its value remains for the judge to assess; the bank cannot rely on it where it is shown to have acted with deceit or gross fault, and a customer may also invoke the rules on unfair terms in contracts of adhesion where they apply. This is a matter of assessment that is referred to the judge on the facts.

Fourth: the criminal classification of the fraudster's conduct

The fraudster's conduct is classified, in general terms, as follows. The prosecution and the court alone choose the right description for each case.

Fraud. This is the closest to a person who uses deceptive methods or assumes a false capacity in order to take another's money. Posing as a bank employee, warning the victim of an imaginary danger and persuading him that the requested code is a way to protect his funds are traditional forms of fraud now moved to electronic means. For the elements of the offence and the defences, see our article on fraud offences.

Information technology crimes. The cybercrime law addresses the use of technological means to obtain money or data without right, unlawful access to an account, a system or data, and the creation of sites or pages for unlawful purposes. A fake payment page that captures card data is an example, and its descriptions may combine with those of the Penal Code.

Forgery and false personation. If a message or page is built with an institution's logo and details to make people believe it comes from that institution, suspicion of forgery or of using a forged document may arise, depending on how the act is described and its purpose.

A person who made an account available to receive the transferred money. Fraudsters often use the accounts of ordinary people who rent or lend them for a small benefit, and the account holder may be questioned for concealing proceeds of crime or taking part in it, depending on his knowledge and intent. That is why anyone who thinks lending his account or card is harmless is mistaken, and it is among the most dangerous traps young people fall into.

One practical point matters: many of these fraudsters are abroad or use false identities, so real tracing depends on how fast the report is made and on the accounts the money passed through inside the banking system, which may be frozen if action is quick. For this reason reporting immediately comes before any debate about classification.

Fifth: proving what happened

Proof is the heart of the case. A customer who has only an oral account against a bank that holds complete records stands weaker than one who preserved the evidence from the first moment. The most important things to keep are:

• The impersonating message itself. Take a screenshot showing the sender name or number, the text, the link and the date and time, and do not delete it. If possible, copy the link address as it is without tapping it again.
• The call log. A screenshot of the call record showing the calling number, date, time and duration, together with notes you wrote immediately about what was said.
• Code messages and alerts. The code message that came from the genuine bank, the transaction alerts, and their timing relative to the impersonating message. That chronology tells the story.
• The account statement. An official stamped statement showing the disputed transaction, its date, time and the beneficiary, requested right after you report.
• Notice to the bank. The written complaint, the acknowledgement or reference number, and any reply from the bank. It proves when the bank knew and how it acted.
• The police report. A copy of the report, the case number and the statement you gave.

Electronic messages and transaction records carry evidentiary value when their attribution and integrity are established, and the opposing party may contest them, so keep them in a way that allows verification and without altering them. We explained the conditions for accepting this evidence in our articles on proof by electronic messages and the digital evidence guide. If you ask the bank for the technical records of the transaction (the device that carried it out, the log of the code being sent, the time of approval), you may ask the court to order the bank to produce them or to appoint a technical expert to examine them if it refuses, because they are in the bank's sole possession.

Take care that screenshots are of your own screen, devices and papers. Do not photograph branch staff or the inside of the premises without permission, and see our article on restrictions on photography inside government buildings and institutions. Ask the bank for official copies of whatever you need instead of photographing.

Sixth: prevention

• A rule that never changes: a real bank does not ask for your secret number, verification code or card details by message, call or link, however urgent it sounds. Any such request is fraud without exception.
• Do not tap links in messages about a problem with your account or card. Open the official bank application yourself, or contact the bank through the channel published on its website, and check whether the alert exists there.
• On a suspicious call: end it, then call the bank yourself through the official channel. Do not trust "I am a bank employee" or any correct details the caller quotes, because the fraudster holds enough data to convince you.
• Do not install remote-control applications at anyone's request, and never move your money to a "safe account."
• Turn on instant alerts for every transaction, set a limit on online transactions if the bank allows it, and use a separate card for online shopping where possible.
• When shopping and paying check the name and address of the site before entering your data, and see what we explained in e-commerce and digital contracts. Do not pay a seller you do not know through a link he sent you.
• Never lend your account, card or phone for any benefit, and do not allow anyone to deposit or transfer money through your account when you do not know where it comes from.
• Review your statement regularly. Early discovery raises the chance that the money can be held before it is scattered.

Cassation Court Principles

The settled approach of the Court of Cassation is that the relationship between a bank and its customer is contractual, governed by the terms of the contract and by the rule of good faith in performance, and that the bank, as a professional, is held to a higher standard of care than an ordinary person in safeguarding deposits and carrying out customer instructions. It does not escape liability merely because the instruction it executed contained correct data, if the circumstances of the transaction called for suspicion and it could have verified. It is likewise settled that assessing fault, apportioning it between the parties, and assessing the effect of the injured party's own fault on compensation are questions of fact for the trial court, provided its reasoning is sound.

The Court of Cassation has also held that a person is not civilly liable for another's criminal act unless his own proven fault and a causal link between that fault and the damage are established, and that the act of a third party (the fraudster) does not negate the liability of someone whose fault helped make the damage possible, just as it does not relieve the injured party of the consequences of his own fault. It is also accepted that clauses exempting a contracting party from liability cannot be invoked in cases of deceit and gross fault, that terms in contracts of adhesion are subject to the judge's control in interpretation and modification as justice requires, and that doubt in their interpretation is resolved in favour of the adhering party.

On the criminal side, the settled position is that fraud is made out by deceptive methods or by assuming a false capacity, capable of making the victim believe and hand over his money under that belief, that a bare lie is not enough unless supported by outward acts, that handing over the money as a result of deception does not amount to valid consent to its disposal, and that the trial court has the power to assess whether the means used were sufficient to produce the deception. It is likewise accepted that the trial court assesses electronic evidence, documents and recordings as it finds reassuring, and that the defence may challenge their integrity and attribution.

Methodological note: the above presents general, settled trends in the case law of the Court of Cassation in principle form. We do not cite appeal numbers or the text of particular judgments. Applying any principle to a specific case depends on its facts, on the latest decisions of the court and on the texts in force at the time of the event, so it must be reviewed by a specialist lawyer before a claim or defence is built on it.

Practical Procedure and Documents

Immediate steps once you discover the fraud

• Block the card and the online service at once. Use the official bank application if it still works, the channel published on the bank's website, or the channel printed on the card, or go to the branch. What matters is speed in cutting off further transactions; do not wait until you are sure of every detail.
• Change your credentials. Change the online banking password and the card's secret number. If your phone came under the control of a suspicious application, delete it and reset the device or have a specialist examine it.
• Notify the bank in writing. File a written objection to the transaction or transactions stating that they did not come from your sound will and that you were the victim of impersonation, with the sequence of events, dates and times. Ask for a reference number and attach the evidence you saved.
• Ask the bank to do what it can to hold the amount. Request in writing that it try to recall the transaction or hold the money with the beneficiary party, contact the receiving bank, and freeze the destination account if it is inside the banking system. A customer cannot do this alone; it is in the hands of the banks and the competent authorities.
• File a report with the authority in charge of electronic crimes. Attach the messages, links and statement, and ask for proof of the report number. The report may be filed through the official channels that the authority makes available.
• Complain to the banking supervisor if the bank does not respond or rejects the objection. The Central Bank of Kuwait has a supervisory role in following customer complaints against the banks under its oversight, and a complaint does not bar going to court.
• Do not wait for the bank's compensation before protecting your rights. Report, document, keep everything the bank issues, and watch for any notice that your objection was rejected or that the sum has been turned into a debt against you.

Documents a lawyer will normally ask for

• Clear images of the message, link or fake page, and the log of incoming calls.
• An official stamped statement showing the disputed transaction and those before and after it.
• The genuine bank messages (the code and the alert) and their timing, and a copy of the banking service contract and the card and electronic service terms.
• The written objection to the bank, its reference number and the bank's reply, and a copy of the police report.
• A note of the devices used and the state of the phone, including any suspicious application installed.
• The customer's identification and proof that the account and card belong to him.

If the bank rejects the objection

The customer may sue the bank for return of the amount debited and for compensation for the damage if its elements are met, and may ask the court to appoint a technical expert to examine the transaction records and the security systems. At the same time the criminal proceedings against the fraudster continue, and the customer may join them as a civil claimant. If the bank demands that the customer repay a debit balance created by the fraudulent transaction, or records his name with a credit bureau, the customer should act quickly. We explained in our article on use of personal data to obtain a loan without the owner's knowledge how a person denies responsibility for the debt, and in credit cards and consumer loans the customer's rights in banking disputes.

Hypothetical Cases

Case one: a "card suspended" message and a code typed into the page

Salem received a message with a logo similar to his bank's saying his card would be suspended unless he updated his data. He tapped the link, entered his card number, then a verification code arrived and he typed it into the page. Minutes later a genuine bank message told him about a deduction he had not made. Salem blocked the card at once, reported to the bank in writing and filed a report with the competent authority. The bank will argue that Salem disclosed the code himself, and Salem will argue that he was the victim of organised deception and that the code message did not clearly show the beneficiary. The court will most likely look at the content of the code message, the bank's earlier warnings and how quickly Salem reported, and it may end by dividing responsibility in a proportion that reflects each party's fault. It matters that Salem reported as soon as he found out; delay would have weakened his position.

Case two: the "fraud prevention officer" and the safe account

A caller claiming to be the bank's fraud prevention department phoned Mariam, quoted her full name and the last digits of her card, told her that her account was compromised, and asked her to install a "support" application and then move her savings to a "safe account." Mariam made several transfers herself through the bank's application. This case is harder for Mariam, because the transactions came from her, using her own genuine tools, and a transfer that the customer carries out personally is normally viewed as an instruction from her own will, so the bank argues it executed a customer's order. She may nevertheless argue that her consent was the product of fraud, and that the bank raised no alert on a series of large, unusual transfers to new accounts, when its security practice calls for stopping at such a pattern. Mariam's real chances lie in how fast the receiving accounts are frozen, in the criminal case, and in holding the bank to account where its own failing is proved. The court assesses all of this.

Case three: selling an item and a "receive payment" link

Khaled listed an item for sale on an advertising platform. A buyer contacted him and sent a link to receive the price, asking him to enter his card details and a code that would reach him. Khaled entered the data and money was withdrawn from his account instead of being deposited into it. The bank may say Khaled was careless with the code, while Khaled insists that the page looked like a receiving page, not a withdrawal page. His argument is weak in that receiving money never needs a code, and strong in that the deception was calculated. As for the fraudster, fraud may combine with unlawful access to payment data. The lesson of this case is that depositing money never requires disclosing a code.

Quick Comparison

• The customer disclosed no code and no data (data stolen elsewhere): the strongest position for the customer. The starting point is that the bank cannot rely on an authorisation that was never given, and the burden of proving the transaction was valid falls on it.
• The customer disclosed the card number but not the verification code: the fault is lighter, and depends on how the transaction was executed without a code and whether the bank followed its verification procedures.
• The customer disclosed the verification code to an impersonator: the most serious kind of carelessness. Responsibility may be divided according to how convincing the deception was, the bank's conduct and its warnings.
• The customer carried out the transfers himself under deception: the hardest to prove, depending on proving fraud and on what the bank should have detected as an unusual pattern.
• The customer delayed reporting: weakens his position, gives him a larger share of the loss and reduces the chance of holding the money.
• The bank was slow after the report: increases the bank's share of responsibility even if the customer erred at the start.
• An intermediary account holder who lent his account: may be questioned criminally and civilly depending on his knowledge and participation, and is not excused simply because he was not the original perpetrator.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does the bank refund the money automatically if the fraud came through a fake link?

There is no automatic refund guaranteed in every case. The bank normally examines how the transaction was carried out and whether the customer disclosed a code or authorised it, and then accepts or rejects the objection according to its policies and the contract. If it refuses, the customer can still complain to the banking supervisor and go to court.

I gave the verification code to the fraudster. Have I lost my rights?

That does not forfeit your rights automatically, but it weakens your position and brings a share of fault to your side. The court considers the circumstances of the deception, the content of the code message, the bank's warnings, how fast you reported and the bank's own conduct. The stronger your evidence and the faster your report, the better your position.

Is a phone call to the bank enough to block my card?

A call is useful for quick blocking, but it is not enough proof on its own. Follow it with a written complaint through a channel that gives you a reference number or an acknowledgement, and keep whatever proves when you notified the bank.

Where do I file the criminal report?

Reports about electronic crimes go to the competent security authority through the channels it announces, and then reach the Public Prosecution. It is best to attach all the evidence you saved and to keep the report number for use with the bank.

Can I recover my money from the fraudster himself?

In principle the injured person may claim the money and compensation before the criminal court as a civil claimant or before the civil court. In practice it depends on being able to identify the fraudster and reach his assets, which turns on the speed of the report and on what could be frozen.

What if my money went to the account of an ordinary person who does not look like a fraudster?

The account holder may be an intermediary, may have lent or rented his account, or may himself be a victim. The competent authorities are asked to trace the account and freeze it where appropriate. The account holder's responsibility depends on his knowledge and participation, which the prosecution and the court assess.

Can I reverse the transaction on my own through the card?

Your objection goes to the bank that issued your card under its objection procedure, and that bank deals with the accepting party and the payment network under the rules that govern such transactions. So start with the written objection and ask for the outcome and the reasons if it is rejected.

Is a message carrying the bank's name always genuine?

No. The sender name can be impersonated, and the fake message may even appear inside the thread of genuine bank messages on the phone. Do not rely on the sender name; rely on the content. Any message that asks for your data or your code, or invites you to a link, is suspect, and the safest course is to check through the official application.

Can I be prosecuted if I unknowingly helped move a fraudster's money?

Criminal liability generally requires knowledge and intent, and a person who was drawn in without knowing the source of the money may escape criminal liability, but good faith has to be shown, especially if he received a reward. To avoid these risks, do not accept money from strangers into your account and do not transfer money at a stranger's request.

Is it different if I am a merchant who receives electronic payments?

Yes. A merchant has contractual obligations to the payment service provider and special rules for reversing amounts in disputes, and must verify the buyer's identity and the nature of the transaction. For the rules on digital contracts, see our article on e-commerce and digital contracts.

Should I involve a lawyer from the start or only after the bank refuses?

From the start is better, because drafting the written objection, arranging the evidence and deciding what to ask of the bank and the security authorities affect the whole course of the case. A lawyer can also help negotiate with the bank before litigation where that is possible.

How does this article differ from your other articles on banking fraud?

This article is specifically about messages, links and calls that impersonate a bank and the effect of disclosing codes, whereas our other articles deal with stolen cards and the bank's responsibility, and with cybercrime generally. To check your rights as a consumer, see consumer protection and e-commerce.

Conclusion

The upshot is that fraud through messages and links impersonating a bank mostly succeeds not through a technical weakness but through psychological pressure on the victim. The strongest protection is therefore a simple rule: no code, no secret number and no card details to anyone by message, call or link, however official the source appears. Whoever follows that rule defeats most of these tricks before they begin.

If it does happen, the deciding factors are speed and documentation: block the card and the service, notify the bank in writing, file the criminal report, and keep the messages, the statement and the call log. These steps preserve the chance of holding the money, build a strong position against the bank and put the authorities on the fraudster's trail. The bank's responsibility for its own failings stands where it is proved, just as the customer's responsibility for his carelessness stands where it is proved, and in the end the facts and the evidence decide.

Because every case differs in its details, showing your papers to a specialist lawyer before replying to the bank or signing any acknowledgement or settlement can save you a great deal. The team at Yumnaak Law Firm (Yumnaak for Legal Practice) is glad to review your papers and help you take the right next step.

Legal Notice

This article is for general awareness. It is not legal advice and is no substitute for consulting a specialist lawyer after reviewing your own papers. Legislative texts may be amended, and outcomes depend on the facts of each case and on the assessment of the competent court.

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